In the case of Jennifer C. Josef v. Evalyn G. Ursua (G.R. No. 267469, February 5, 2025), the Supreme Court declared that the property relations of the herein parties who are a same-sex couple, and thus are incapacitated to marry each other when they cohabited, is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code.

 

This case involves a Complaint for Partition with Damages filed by petitioner Jennifer C. Josef (Josef) against Evalyn G. Ursua (Ursua), over a property which Josef alleged was co-owned by them.

 

The parties became a couple and lived together in 2005. After some time, in 2006, the parties bought a house in Quezon City. Josef alleged that both her and Ursua contributed to the purchase and renovation of the subject property but agreed that the title to the same be registered under Ursua’s name only, for convenience and considering that the bank loan for the same was also under the name of the latter.

 

Ursua, in 2007, signed an Acknowledgement of Third-Party Interest in Real Property (the “Acknowledgement”) in favor of Josef, recognizing and acknowledging that the latter paid about 50% of the expenses in acquiring and renovating the subject property.

 

The couple eventually separated and agreed that the subject property be sold and to equally split the proceeds of the sale between them. However, Ursua changed her mind, refused to sell the house, and repudiated Josef’s claim of co-ownership, prompting the latter to execute an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the subject property and file the Complaint for Partition with Damages.

 

Trial ensued where Josef presented the Acknowledgement signed by Ursua. Ursua, on the other hand, maintained that she exclusively owned the house but admitted, through her Judicial Affidavit, that she signed the Acknowledgement which she clarified that she did not intend to be bound by it. The trial court ruled in favor of Ursua, finding that aside from Ursua’s Acknowledgement, Josef failed to prove her contributions to the acquisition and renovation of the subject property. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

 

The issue found by the Supreme Court for this case is whether the Acknowledgment signed by Ursua sufficiently established co-ownership of the subject property between the former and Josef.

 

I.

 

On the sufficiency of the Acknowledgement, the Supreme Court found for Josef, finding that authenticity and due execution of the Acknowledgement – pertinent provisions are reproduced below – was duly proved by the admission of Ursua that she signed the same, to wit:

 

I, EVALYN GONZALES URSUA, of legal age, Filipino, single, and residing at 183 Don Damaso Street, Don Antonio Heights, Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City, hereby declares and acknowledges that:

 

I am the registered owner of that certain parcel of land with improvements existing thereon situated at 183 DON DAMASO STREET, DON ANTONIO HEIGHTS, BRGY. HOLY SPIRIT, CAPITOL DISTRICT, QUEZON CITY, covered by TCT No. N-289262 and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City…

 

. . . .

 

I hereby declare and acknowledge that JENNIFER C. JOSEF, of legal age, single, and also a resident of 183 Don Damaso Street, Don Antonio Heights, Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City, had financed and paid for about fifty percent (50%) of the expenses in the acquisition of the above-described parcel of land and in the construction of the improvement thereon.

 

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above. I hereby acknowledge and declare that the said JENNIFER C. JOSEF owns interest in the above-described parcel of land to the extent of her actual participation in terms of money in its acquisition and construction of the improvements thereon, constituting about fifty percent (50%) more or less of the value of the property, subject to the determination of the actual percentage of the aforesaid interest based on records and documents.

 

Should I predecease the aforesaid JENNIFER C. JOSEF, without any prior determination of her actual interest in the aforesaid property and its improvements, the same shall be conclusively determined to be fifty percent (50%) of its market value.

 

Although Ursua clarified that she did not intend to be bound by the Acknowledgement she signed, the Supreme Court found that the document is susceptible to several interpretations raising ambiguity as to the share of the petitioner in the acquisition of the subject property. The Supreme Court resolved the ambiguity in favor of Josef taking the ambiguity contra proferentem or against the party causing the ambiguity which could have avoided it by the exercise of a little more care – such party being Ursua, being the author of the Acknowledgement. The Supreme Court likewise reiterated the basic rule in contracts law that when different construction of a provision are otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was made, which in this case is Josef. The Supreme Court ultimately resolved the ambiguity such that the petitioner is entitled to 50% share of the subject property and that based on the provisions of the Acknowledgement, Ursua wanted to acknowledge at least 50% share of the subject property as Josef’s share. The Supreme Court declared that Josef is a co-owner of the subject property and is entitled to 50% share of the same.

 

II.

 

The Supreme Court also took the opportunity to recall that the parties lived together as a couple in an apartment in 2005, without the benefit of marriage whose property regime is governed by Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. The Supreme Court recognized that “the applicability of these provisions became a nuanced question” in cases of same-sex couple cohabitation because Philippine laws do not recognize same-sex marriage within its jurisdiction.

 

The aforestated provisions are reproduced below:

 

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

 

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

 

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

 

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

 

Article 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

 

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

 

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

 

The Supreme Court noted that the term “capacitated to marry each other” under Article 147 of the Family Code pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage – defined in the Family Code as a union between a man and a woman. The Court declared that being a same-sex couple when they cohabited, Josef and Ursua are not capacitated to marry each other, and thus, Article 148 governs their property relations.

The Supreme Court stated that under Article 148 of the Family Code, the properties acquired during cohabitation can be considered the common property of petitioner and respondent if:

 

(1) these were acquired during their cohabitation; and

(2) there is evidence that the properties were acquired through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry, which are presumed to be equal but proof of actual contribution is required such that if the actual contribution of a party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and there can be no presumption of equal shares.

 

The Supreme Court noted that the Acknowledgment signed by Ursua shows the actual contribution of Josef, that is, 50% share of the subject property which Ursua recognized when she signed the document. The Court estopped Ursua to question the contribution of petitioner in the acquisition of the subject property and declared that having admitted the actual contribution of Josef, their corresponding shares are prima facie presumed equal. Thus, with Article 148 of the Family Code and the Acknowledgement executed by Ursua, Josef is a co-owner to the extent of 50% share of the subject property.

 

According to the Court, considering that there is co-ownership between herein parties, then each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as her share is concerned. Having rightful interest over the subject property, Josef has the right to demand the division of the subject property.

 

The Supreme Court granted Josef’s Petition and reversed the Decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court likewise declared Jennifer C. Josef as owner of 50% of the subject property, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

 

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